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Overview
Marc Champagne’s new book Consciousness and the Philosophy of Signs is a triumph. The book is eminently well informed, well reasoned, well written, and well worth reading. It may also still 
be well ahead of its time, but my guess is that it will eventually prove to be 
a watershed. The watershed in question concerns many important distinc-
tions—none more important than “Qualia”: the intrinsic feel of a given 
experience. The notion (and stubborn presence) of felt, qualitative experi-
ence has proven to be a wretched stumbling block throughout the course 
of the western tradition; so making progress on the problem—especially 
when working within the contemporary Anglo-American tradition—is not 
a job for the cavalier. One must tread lightly, with disciplinary grounding 
and respect, or be dismissed out of hand. On the other hand, an abun-
dance of critical sceādwīsnes1 is called for, some of which will inevitably 
cut against the grain of philosophical commitments and academic fashion.
1 The Old English term sceādwīsnes is a colorful compound (or “kenning”) that 
can be glossed ‘dividing-wisdom’. The term translates to ‘reason’ or ‘discernment’, and its 
two morphemes are cognate with “shed” (< sceād ) + “wiseness” (< wīsnes). Notably, the 
historical semantics of “sceād” in the first half of the compound have nothing to do with 
a toolshed and everything to do with a watershed. Someone who reasons well, in other 
words, practices discernment or wisdom in the identification and application of separa-
tions, distinctions and divisions.
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Written in dialogue with current trends in cognitive science and 
analytic philosophy of mind, the book opens by affirming an influential 
division between Qualities and Functions in recent theories of cognition. 
These concepts map onto “phenomenal consciousness” and “access con-
sciousness”, respectively (following Block 1995). As Champagne clarifies 
up front (2018: 3), this basic division has nothing to do with the infamous 
(and dubious) mind-body split inherited from Descartes. Rather, the 
distinction identifies a fundamental difference between Feeling and Do-
ing—the former being phenomenological, the latter psychological (2018: 
11). Notably, cognitive science has lavished attention on the functional/
psychological aspects of consciousness while neglecting feeling or felt 
qualities. Analytic philosophers of mind, in turn, have generally dispensed 
with felt experience, often dismissing it as an illusion, due to its practically 
inconsequential nature. Nonetheless, key thinkers such as David Chalm-
ers, working at the intersection of philosophy and cognitive science, have 
for more than two decades called for the development of a “fundamental 
theory of the conscious mind” (1996)—one that integrates quality and 
function (Champagne 2018: 8).
In seeking to realize Chalmers’ project, Champagne appeals to further 
distinctions and developments in pragmatism and semiotic philosophy. In 
so doing, his work is closely aligned with that of Mark Johnson (e.g., 2007), 
though this connection is not registered in the book. Both thinkers draw 
on pragmatist thought to illustrate how qualia should be granted pride 
of place in a unified theory of mind. Both insist that thinking and feeling 
are fundamentally integrated activities (instead of being fundamentally 
discrete: see Champagne 2018: 8; Johnson 2007: 1). Both argue force-
fully that we must move beyond the philosophy of language to develop 
a more comprehensive theory of meaning. But, whereas Johnson blends 
the thought of William James and John Dewey with quasi-semiotic devel-
opments from Cognitive Linguistics to make his case, Champagne goes 
to the source—tracing both Pragmatism and Semiotic to their original 
integration in the work of Charles Sanders Peirce and building his case 
from there. This makes sense. Not only was Peirce the mentor of both 
James and Dewey and the acknowledged father of philosophical pragma-
tism, but, as Champagne clarifies (2018: 14, citing Kilpinen 2008: 217), 
given the scope and depth of his contributions, we can no more work to 
develop a non-Peircean semiotic today than we can attempt to develop a 
non-Darwinian biology or a non-Einsteinian physics.
Working across the span of seven well-conceived, tightly integrated 
chapters, Champagne makes a case for the re-evaluation and application 
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of three key concepts from the hard-won thought of Peirce, arguing that 
grafting these concepts into contemporary cognitive science and phi-
losophy of mind would enable the realization of Chalmers’ mandate for a 
fundamental theory of consciousness. These three concepts are Iconicity, 
Tone, and Prescission (as described in more detail below). But as seasoned 
semioticians know all too well, the piecemeal application of Peircean ideas 
simply won’t do. In fact, the overarching irony of Champagne’s argument 
is that the very neglect of these three concepts in contemporary Anglo-
American thought is demonstrably the result of haphazard applications of 
other Peircean ideas that were taken out of context to start with—to the 
point of eventually becoming dissociated from Peirce altogether. “Indexi-
cality” was adopted but divorced from “Iconicity”. “Type and Token” were 
adopted but divorced from “Tone”. “Qualia” was adopted but divorced from 
“Prescission”. As a result, all three became relatively empty signifiers to be 
filled by pre-conceived habits of thought. With this in mind, it would not 
be far fetched to say that in writing this book Champagne is calling for 
something of a grand conceptual reunion (accompanied by intellectual 
acknowledgement and theoretical reconciliation).
To actually reap the benefit of Peircean semiotic concepts (especially 
the insight and clarity of thought that they enable), it is necessary to ap-
preciate their situation relative to a broader network of relations within 
the overall system Peirce defines—the least dispensable aspect of which is 
a set of three interdependent yet irreducible categories: Firstness (Quality), 
Secondness (Reaction), and Thirdness (Mediation). Champagne’s critical 
appreciation of Peirce’s system is complemented by thorough explanation 
of its importance for contemporary Anglo-American thought. The ideas 
and their connections do not come easy since they cut against the grain 
of entrenched habits of mind. In view of such a challenging task, then, it 
is fortunate that Champagne marshals qualities of communication that 
are intelligible and straightforward, being amply illustrated with examples 
and woven together with narrative contextualization. I will return to an 
evaluation of the book’s argument and approach toward the end of this 
review. First it will be more fitting (and hopefully more helpful) for me to 
offer an overview of (or take on) the book’s argument itself. In so doing, I 
follow Champagne’s lead to focus on the indispensable role that Iconicity, 
Tone, and Prescission should play in a fundamental theory of conscious-
ness, paying special attention to the relationships these share with the 
embattled concept of Qualia.
The term “Qualia” and its companion “Quale” are so familiar to many 
by present day that they might easily be taken for granted. In fact, both 
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terms were coined by Peirce, as Champagne discusses at length. Remark-
ably, then, three of the most substantial problems perceived to beset 
contemporary theories of Qualia would be neutralized if the concept in 
question were recontextualized within the larger system of thought that 
gave birth to it. The first of these problems can be neutralized by under-
standing the relationship between Qualia and “Prescission”.
Prescission and Qualia
To understand prescission and its relationship to Qualia, it is first neces-
sary to pay attention to the categories of experience. Qualia (and Quale) 
are by nature phenomena of fundamental Firstness in Peirce’s system of 
thought. Any felt experience, however subtle, complex, or arresting, is first 
and foremost a firsthand experience: i.e., an experience of Firstness. But 
as soon as we reflect on such feelings, or even begin to pay attention to 
them, what we notice becomes inextricable from its physical effects. This 
necessarily introduces aspects of Secondness. If we happen to have a term 
for the feeling in question, this, in turn, necessarily introduces aspects of 
culture, language, and conventionality—modes of Thirdness—into the 
experience. So one of the immediate problems with discussing Qualia, 
which is ultimately pure Firstness, is that it is virtually impossible to isolate 
without recourse to Secondness and Thirdness. Even the act of naming 
qualia “Qualia” corrupts the phenomenon itself by introducing a con-
cept: something “wedded to our conceptual apparatus” (2018: 119). This 
causal and conceptual interference might even lead us to the conclusion 
that what we are discussing is actually illusory. We might even despair 
that whatever it is, it can never be captured by science and is therefore 
unlicensed by reason. Can we then reasonably discuss “a concept wholly 
based on attention to a quality” (2018: 119)?
These would seem to be crippling defeaters; so why was Peirce un-
daunted by them? Champagne identifies “Prescission” or “Prescissive 
Abstraction” as the reason. As Champagne notes, prescision is a kind of 
“deliberate myopia” (2018: 5): “Prescission is what happens when, going 
against the facts, we suppose that some portion of a complex phenomenon 
is absent” (2018: 44). Prescission is a foundational practice that underlies 
Peirce’s broader semiotic philosophy. Peirce adapts the idea from Duns 
Scotus’s contrast between “formal distinctions” and “real distinctions” 
(2018: 118). The difference between one color and another is a real dis-
tinction, but the difference between the color of paint and the paint itself 
is a formal or “prescinded” distinction. Hence the activity of prescission 
is the identification of “a mere logical possibility” (Champagne 2018: 119; 
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1903: EP2.294); but this does not make the possibility or the activity that 
generates it unreasonable or irrelevant.
It may seem bizarre that we can, for instance, imagine the smile of 
the Cheshire cat without the cat being present, but the fact remains that 
we can (2018: 46); so we need to be able to account for this ability and 
incorporate it into our theory building. In fact, prescission is something 
we do constantly, with important benefits and consequences. Any given 
experience, event, or object is so heavily situated and complex that we 
inevitably discuss its features or qualities as formal abstractions. But this 
does not mean that prescission is the same as decontextualization or rei-
fication: “A color like orange can be prescinded but orange does not exist 
apart from orange things” (2018: 21, 26).
We rely on prescissive abstraction whenever we self-reflect, whenever 
we notice a pattern, and whenever we reason according to a pattern (a.k.a. 
“diagrammatic thinking”; 2018: 105, 107). But, according to Peirce, as 
Champagne notes, prescission can be explained without reliance on in-
trospection (2018: 39–40). To see how this is so, it is helpful to note that 
complexity subsumes simplicity (2018: 105). This points to a fundamental 
asymmetry between the two (2018: 105, 121): i.e., complexity implies 
simplicity but simplicity does not imply complexity. Put differently, a 
relatum can exist without a relation; but a relation cannot exist without 
relata (2018: 12). The same holds true for Qualia: Access Consciousness 
(Function) implies the presence of Phenomenal Consciousness (Qualia), 
but Phenomenal Consciousness does not imply the presence of Access 
Consciousness. Hence, there is something that Qualia, Relata and sim-
plicity share in common. In Peircean terminology, this common ground 
can be described as “Tone”.
Tone and Qualia
To appreciate the role that Tone plays in the validation of Qualia, and in the 
realization of Qualia’s integration with Function, it is helpful to clarify its 
status relative to two key Peircean triads: (1) the Representamen-Object-
Interpretant triad and (2) the Tone-Token-Type triad.
First consider Qualia’s relationship to the three elements of any triadic 
sign relation. As Champagne describes, “despite the unbreakable triadic 
bond which characterizes any representation, whatever is burdened with 
the logical duty of standing for something else—no matter what it may 
consist in—can be prescinded in such a way as to disregard its employment 
in that capacity” (2018: 36). Any sign relation must involve thee elements: 
(1) a representamen (or sign vehicle), (2) an object (being represented), 
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and (3) an Interpretant (i.e., effective creation of a new sign in the mind of 
an interpreter, whether witting or unwitting). Tone identifies a sign vehicle 
(or “Representamen”) involved in any act of prescission. It is “a monadic 
dimension that has the power to be the qualitative vehicle of representa-
tion but which in virtue of its ordinal primacy remains serenely ignorant 
of whether it is actually employed in so raucous an activity” (Champagne 
2018: 38; Peirce c.1896: CP 1.422–426).
While the Peircean distinction between Type and Token has proven 
to be very influential in the analytic tradition, the curious deletion of 
Tone from the picture undermines the effectiveness (and validity) of the 
distinction. Since all tokens subsume tones (2018: 39), and since “a type 
is what permits one to encounter tokens of the same tone” (2018: 65), any 
attempt to accurately apply Type and Token without reference to Tone, 
will simply miss the point and fumble opportunities to solve problems 
that are otherwise intractable—prominently including the hard problem 
of consciousness.
Applied to the problem of Qualia, or phenomenal consciousness, 
Champagne notes that “It is not that access-consciousness and phenome-
nal-consciousness are tokens of different types; rather, the latter is the tone 
of the former’s tokens” (2018: 39). In other words, felt experience serves 
as the tone of all token instances of functional experience. This approach 
is important since it circumvents mere reification of prescinded features. 
And by “refusing to reify the features it prescinds, such an approach allows 
us to respect the distinct character of phenomenal experience without 
turning it into a chimera” (2018: 38–39).
While indexical relations are enabled by tokens, tones serve to make 
iconic relations possible. If the relationship between a sign vehicle and its 
object is iconic, as Champagne clarifies, the sign vehicle must be a tone: 
“only as a token can a sign-vehicle have an indexical bond to its object. 
Similarity requires a shared quality, so only as a tone can a sign-vehicle 
enjoy an iconic bond to the quality referred to” (2018: 58). With this in 
mind, we begin to see the overlooked importance of iconicity (relation-
ships of similarity or resemblance) for framing an adequate account of 
Qualia and the indispensable role it plays in consciousness.
Iconicity and Qualia
Iconicity concerns both mind-world (observed) similarities and world-
world (inherent) similarities between sign-vehicles and their objects (2018: 
57). Taking color as an illustration, Champagne argues (following much 
more careful discussion than I am able to reproduce in a brief book re-
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view) that “experiences are red in the same sense in which apples are red” 
(2018: 73). Given the symmetrical nature of resemblance, if perceptual 
experience A resembles apple color B, it is also the case that apple color B 
resembles perceptual experience A. Hence, in true iconic relations, only 
an Interpretant can determine which of the two relata is a sign vehicle 
and which is an object (2018: 61). Similarities shared between A and B 
are also necessarily similarities between features of A and B, otherwise 
the two would be indistinct. As such, iconic signs must be said to share 
underlying Tones (instead of an underlying Tokens), enabling features to 
be prescinded from the complex whole (2018: 62).
These distinctions and definitions are important to note since main-
stream philosophy of language (which tends to inform cognitive science 
and philosophy of mind) is overwhelmingly focused on indexical sign 
functions (2018: 63). Indexicality involves relations of direct reference and 
efficient causality. But causality and direct reference only serve to describe 
aspects of functional consciousness. Qualitative consciousness cannot be 
captured by either. In Champagne’s words, “Since qualia are not captured 
by causality and since indexicality works precisely by exploiting causality, 
qualia are not captured by indexicality” (2018: 53).
Iconic relations, on the other hand are perfectly suited for referring 
to qualia, and the more iconic the relation, the more a given sign vehicle 
and its object will resemble each other (2018: 84). As perceptions of 
resemblance increase, felt sensations become dominant, and degrees of 
coalescence between sign vehicles and their objects increase (2018: 83–85). 
This is typified in the contemplation of a complex visual icon such as a 
painting or film, in which we are often able to lose ourselves as coordi-
nated cascades of sign vehicle tones and their iconic objects coalesce in 
consciousness (2018: 85).
Mapping iconic relations to phenomenal/qualitative aspects of con-
sciousness on one hand and indexical relations to material/functional 
aspects of consciousness on the other enables a unified account of con-
sciousness, but it does not obliterate the border between them. The gap 
between the material and the phenomenal remains, and it remains at both 
epistemic and ontological levels (2018: 52, 79–87, including helpful discus-
sion of a related distinction in Poinsot 1632). Notably, the bridge between 
the two is neither iconic nor indexical. The bridge between the two is a 
more general semiotic system: Champagne’s account demonstrates that 
a general (Peircean) semiotic actually allows for a unified account that is 
both licensed by reason and resistant to reification.
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Further Evaluation
As mentioned above, I find Champagne’s argument and approach to be 
a triumph of clear writing, with an abundance of helpful examples, and 
a refreshing knack for narrative contextualization. Unlike much other 
work in semiotics, Champagne also goes to great lengths to accommodate 
readers who are unfamiliar with semiotic terminology. The flip side of 
such accommodation might be overcorrection in some cases, potentially 
undermining the accurate communication (or didactic explication) of 
new ideas in the process. To be clear, I notice very few cases of such over-
reach in my reading of this text but would like to point out a handful in 
case they prove helpful for future editions or subsequent developments 
of the project.
First, given the importance of tracking the categories for Peircean 
semiotic, and given the ethics of terminology related to core concepts in 
any system, there are cases in which the ordering and/or paraphrase of key 
terms from Peirce could be handled more carefully, lest alternative uses 
obfuscate more than they clarify. Take, for example, the cloaked reference 
to iconicity, indexicality, and symbolicity in the following passage: “Ac-
cording to the Peircean theory I defend, there are three ways in which one 
can know things, namely by convention, causality, and similarity” (2018: 
52). This listing is paraphrased and also reverse-ordered relative to Peirce’s 
system. These decisions in general may be well and good (as Champagne 
himself argues elsewhere, 2015: 541–544); but, in such cases, clarification 
of terms relative to Peirce’s system—either in a footnote or by using in-
text parentheticals—would be helpful to ensure the connections are not 
lost by readers who are still learning to make them. The same terms are 
used on page 5, again without didactic mapping, although the ordering is 
reversed to match Peirce’s system of categories: i.e., “similarity, causation, 
and convention”. On page 93, the Peircean terms are used instead (“sym-
bols, indices, and icons”), but the ordering is reversed yet again relative 
to Peirce’s system. On the facing page (2018: 92), the three sign functions 
are clarified in-text using parenthetical asides, and the ordering is still 
reversed. Taking more care with consistent ordering and clarification in 
such instances might serve readers even better.2
Next, considering terminology, it is sometimes necessary, in spite of 
approachability concerns, that key terms should induce struggle—in order 
2 Again, to clarify, this is not to deny that reverse-ordering may well be more didac-
tically and experientially meaningful—a point that Champagne argues elsewhere (2015: 
541–544). Rather, the more basic issue at stake is consistency of presentation with explicit 
acknowledgement of rationale in situ.
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to change old habits of mind. Champagne seems amply aware of this point 
in most cases. One exception might be his use of “interpretation” in place 
of the less familiar “interpretant” in the text (see, e.g., 2018: 4, 79). The 
former is certainly more approachable, and as passages elsewhere in the 
text make clear (see e.g., 2018: 61, 81, 92), Champagne is well aware of the 
difference. The Peircean Interpretant goes beyond mere acts of interpreta-
tion to include the creation of a new sign, typically mediated by various 
degrees of habit or preparation such as biological endowment, population-
level enculturation, and individual and group-level training—enabling an 
individual to interpret across a range of modalities from the deliberate 
to the instinctive. Clarifying this more directly might serve readers well.
Finally, it might be helpful to reconsider citation practices for source 
dates that refer to posthumously published works. This is especially im-
portant for tracking insights from Peirce—and even moreso when trying 
to rehabilitate and apply mature ideas from Peirce. In such cases, citation 
dates that are not historical risk making one’s argument more difficult to 
evaluate. Although, to be clear, the intention here appears to be reader 
accommodation, certainly not deliberate obfuscation.
Again, these are minor suggestions indeed compared to the rigor, 
empathy, and attention that Champagne marshals throughout the text 
in the production of this book. Helpful turns of phrase interweave with 
crystal clear argumentation and refreshing shifts to illustrative examples 
and narrative historiography. In the process we find excellent overviews 
of semiotics (2018: 14–27) and chart the inception and demise of key 
terms borrowed from Peirce by Anglo-American philosophers. In the 
process we also discover that Champagne is remarkably conversant with 
contemporary cognitive science and analytic philosophy (both historical 
and contemporary). And in spite of his equally strong grasp of Peircean 
pragmatism and Peircean semiotic, we also find a thinker who is not sus-
ceptible to narrow-minded or preachy polemics (see, e.g., 2018: 59–60). 
All three traditions are taken seriously and treated with respect in a spirit 
of cooperation toward a shared goal. Even so, when the time comes to 
reject invalid ideas or call out the absurdity of illegitimate conclusions, 
Champagne pulls no punches. In the process, he does more than offer a 
new vision for unified consciousness (which would certainly be enough). 
He also models a promising vision for the future of semiotics as a perspec-
tive on the disciplines, prominently including philosophy and the other 
cognitive sciences.
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Semiotic Vision
Champagne’s vision for semiotics could be described as “Peirce-Plus”: an 
approach that is deeply acquainted with Peirce’s semiotic architectonic 
while still managing to be ecumenical (2018: 7). He insists that there 
is ultimately no non-Peircean semiotic (as discussed above), while also 
insisting that not all semiotic is Peircean (2018: 14). Accordingly, Cham-
pagne’s vision integrates semiotics with pragmatism (e.g., 2018: 7; see 
also Champagne 2016) while also taking discipline-specific issues and 
debates seriously. He manages his argument both as a semiotician and 
as a disciplinary insider. More to the point, in applying “philosophy of 
signs to philosophy of mind” (2018: 13), Champagne casts a long-term 
vision for the reorientation of all disciplines toward a general semiotic 
as a fundamental theory if not a new science (2018: 8). This can be seen 
as a special priority for disciplines that have adopted key concepts from 
semiotics without taking care to appreciate and apply them systematically. 
In the case of Qualia, the term’s dissociation from its Peircean origins and 
its accompanying conceptual apparatus—along with other bastardiza-
tions such as the dissociation of Tone from Token and Type—have had 
dire consequences (as Champagne illustrates throughout the book). Such 
neglect creates seemingly intractable dilemmas and distractions where 
there might otherwise have been no real problems to speak of.
Champagne’s vision for semiotics is one that is awake to history 
(building on, e.g., Deely 2001), aware that signs are relational instead of 
material (2018: 19–20), and keenly aware of related fallacies—such as that 
of “limiting signs to language and human culture” (2018: 15). Insights 
such as these enable him to argue that the philosophy of mind must be 
broader than the philosophy of language, since language simply cannot 
convey everything (2018: 63, 68). The fact that Iconicity is still largely 
absent from formal semantics (2018: 7), in spite of the crucial role it plays 
in referring to Qualia; the fact that Tone was neglected as a ground for 
prescission; and the fact that contemporary Anglo-American thought 
remains averse to Qualia (in spite of its pervasive presence), all point to 
a fundamental need for cultivating appreciation for the role of Firstness. 
Firstness, Champagne affirms, is necessarily ineffable. It evades description 
even though it pervades our experience (2018: 71; following Short 2006: 
171). Since semiotics is “a paradigm that explicitly includes Firstness in 
its basic commitments” (2018: 120), in an account that is already fully 
integrated with function, semiotic philosophy provides a “conceptual 
apparatus” that makes qualia seem sensible (2018: 117).
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Finally, Champagne’s vision for semiotics is one that works to cultivate 
“a worldview in which meaning does not seem out of place” (2018: 110). 
Indeed, only in a “disenchanted vision of the world” (2018: 96) could quali-
ties of Firstness seem suspicious—especially given that such qualities are 
the norm. This points to a veritable stockpile of “revisionist work” that is 
needed in order to move Anglo-American thought (and other varieties 
of western thought) away from a “fundamentally mistaken worldview” 
(2018: 89, 91). In the process, it helps to remember that progress is possible: 
Champagne reminds us that even discussions of consciousness were once 
taboo in this tradition (2018: 2). His argument for the reality of Qualia 
and its need for conceptualization via “prescissive intervention” (2018: 
113) are all the more compelling in this light. And the narrow-minded 
neglect that led to the exclusion of prescission, Tone, and Iconicity—due 
to the illegitimate alienation of Qualia and Indexicality from semiotic 
thought—must be relentlessly called to task.
Cognitive science and philosophy of mind now have a viable account 
of phenomenal consciousness qua “Qualia” that is not only licensed by 
reason but also fully integrated and reconciled with oppositional accounts 
of access consciousness. As a result, the argument and evidence in Cham-
pagne’s book, once acknowledged, are sure to lead philosophy of mind 
and cognitive science in a fresh, new direction.
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